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JURISDICTION 
This case is an appeal from an order entered by the Third District Court for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, West Jordan Department, on August 4, 2009. See Hearing 
Transcript (attached as "Addendum A"). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court err when it refused to suppress evidence despite finding 
that the trial court did not strictly comply with Rule 40(i)(l) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 40") in obtaining a search warrant subsequently 
executed on the Defendant Mauricio Sosa's (hereinafter "Mr. Sosa") residence? 
Standard of Review: In reaching its erroneous determination not to suppress the 
evidence seized with a search warrant obtained in violation of Rule 405 the trial court 
failed to apply the correct law to the facts of the case. The trial court's interpretation of a 
rule of procedure is reviewed for correctness. State v. Dominguez, 2009 UT App. 73, f 
5, 206 P.3d 640,642. 
Preservation of Issue on Appeal: The trial court accepted Mr. Sosa's "Sery plea" 
on August 31, 2007, in which Appellant reserved the right to appeal the order denying his 
motion to suppress. (Court Record ("CR"): 86, 92); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 937-40 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Mr. Sosa timely filed his Notice of Appeal with the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, West Jordan Department, on November 20, 2009. (CR: 102-
04). 
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APPLICABLE STATUTE 
The statutory provision applicable to the issue in this case is Rule 40(i)(l) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The relevant portion of the rule reads: 
(i) Magistrate to retain and file copies . . . 
(i)(l) At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of 
the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded 
testimony on which the warrant is based and shall, within a reasonable 
time, file those sealed documents in court files which are secured against 
access by the public. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case commenced on August 11, 2008, when the Third District Court issued a 
search warrant authorizing the search of Mr. Sosa's residence. See Warrant and Affidavit 
(attached as "Addendum B"). Sandy City Police searched Mr. Sosa's residence on 
August 14, 2009, and subsequently arrested him based on evidence obtained during the 
search. (CR: 05, 07-08). An Information was filed on September 3, 2008, charging Mr. 
Sosa with five counts: Counts I & II, possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute (DFZ), a first degree felony; Count III, possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, a third degree felony; Count IV, possession of a controlled substance (DFZ), a 
class A misdemeanor; and Count V, possession of drug paraphernalia (DFZ), a class A 
misdemeanor. (CR: 01-05) 
On July 3, 2009, Mr. Sosa filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized with the 
warrant on the basis that the warrant was obtained in violation of Rule 40. (CR: 62-65). 
The State filed its opposition to Mr. Sosa's motion to suppress on July 20, 2009. (CR: 
2 
66-70). On August 4, 2009, the trial court held oral argument on the motion to suppress, 
during which time the court orally denied Mr. Sosa's motion. (CR: 59, 71-72; Hearing 
Transcript ("HT"): pp. 15-17). 
On August 31, 2009, Mr. Sosa pled guilty to modified Count I, possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony; Count III, 
possession of a weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony; and Count IV, 
possession of a controlled substance (DFZ), a class A misdemeanor. (CR: 73-92). Mr. 
Sosa entered a "Sery plea" in which he preserved his right to appeal the court's denial of 
his motion to suppress. (CR: 86). On October 26, 2009, Mr. Sosa was sentenced to 
concurrent and suspended sentences of 1-15 years on Count I, 0-5 years on Count III, and 
365 days on Count IV. (CR: 93-101). In lieu of jail time, Sosa was sentenced to 36 
months probation, 100 hours of community service, and a $500 fine. (CR: 93-101). This 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The events giving rise to this appeal occurred on August 11, 2008, when law 
enforcement sought a warrant authorizing the search of Mr. Sosa's residence. (CR: 62; 
HT: 2-4); see also (CR:66) (where the State concurs with the recitation of facts in Mr. 
Sosa's motion to suppress). A detective presented the Third District Court with a warrant 
supplemented by an affidavit and supporting documents. (CR: 62-63; HT: 2-3). The 
court reviewed the documents, signed the warrant, and then returned the only copies of 
the original warrant and associated documents to the detective with an instruction that the 
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detective file the documents with the clerk's office.1 (CR: 63; HT: 2-4, 15-16). The 
detective received and retained sole custody of the warrant documents for an unknown 
period of time (less than one day, possibly as short as 5 minutes) (CR: 63, 67; HT: 4, 12, 
15), before presenting them to the clerk's office where they were filed and sealed later 
that day. (CR: 63,67; HT: 3-4). 
Mr. Sosa subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered with the 
search warrant, arguing that the warrant was obtained in a violation of Rule 40's 
requirement that the magistrate, not law enforcement, retain, seal, and file all warrant 
documents. (CR: 62-65). At oral argument on the motion to suppress, both the trial court 
and the State acknowledged that the court gave the police officer sole custody of the 
original documents for an unknown period of time, and that the officer thereafter filed the 
original documents with the court clerk. (CR: 67, HT: 12, 15-17). The trial court 
explained its reasoning for entrusting the documents with law enforcement as follows: 
"when the officer takes those documents from me [the issuing judge], they are acting as 
my agent to carry it down and actually have it filed instead of me actually walking down 
and having it filed." (HT:15-16) (emphasis added). Despite acknowledging facts that 
point to a Rule 40 violation, the district court found that any such violation was de 
minimus and denied the motion to suppress. (HT: 15-17). 
1
 For the Court's reference, the judge's chambers in this case are on the third floor of the 
West Jordan courthouse and the clerk's office is on the first floor. (HT: 4). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rule 40 was specifically enacted to ensure that Utah courts have a basis for 
confidence in the accuracy, authenticity, and completeness of warrant documents, and to 
prevent the possibility that original warrant documents are mishandled or altered before 
their retention and sealing with the court. Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, fflf 22-23, 149 
P.3d 352, 358; State v. Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, % 8; 206 P.3d 640, 642-43. 
Warrant documents need this protection to ensure that a defendant has a fair opportunity 
to challenge a warrant's validity if he or she so desires. Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, f^ 
17. When law enforcement has sole custody of the original warrant documents before 
they are filed with the court, Rule 40 is violated. Id. ^ 11. Because of the importance of 
keeping these documents free from mishandling and alteration, Utah courts enforce Rule 
40 strictly by applying the exclusionary rule to Rule 40 violations. Id. Yl 17-18. Rule 40 
was violated in the instant case when law enforcement had sole custody of warrant 
documents after the trial court issued the warrant but before retention, sealing, and filing. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision to deny Mr. Sosa's motion 
to suppress. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED SOSA'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED WITH A SEARCH WARRANT THAT THE 
COURT ACKNOWLEDGED DID NOT STRICTLY COMPLY WITH RULE 40. 
A. The Search Warrant Was Obtained In Violation of Rule 40 Because 
Law Enforcement Had Sole Custody of the Warrant Documents After 
They Were Signed but Before They Were Retained and Sealed by the 
Court. 
In Anderson v. Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a then-common practice 
in which magistrates would issue a warrant and then return the warrant and supporting 
documents to law enforcement. 2006 UT 79, If 2. Law enforcement would retain the 
documents until the warrant was executed, after which law enforcement would return the 
documents to the magistrate who would either file them with the court or return them to 
the officer with an instruction to file them. Id. The Anderson court invalidated this 
practice, citing two concerns. Id. % 22. First, this practice left the court without any 
record to support the warrant's issuance until after execution. Id. Second, this practice 
opened the door for court records to be "mishandled or even altered without detection." 
Id. The court explained that when warrant documents are handled by non-court 
personnel prior to filing with the court, the court has no basis for confidence in the 
"accuracy, authenticity, or completeness" of those documents. Id. Based on these 
concerns, the Anderson court issued a mandate that magistrates retain a copy of the 
issued warrant and supporting documents, "rather than surrendering to law enforcement 
the only copies of such material." Id. 
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Rule 40 was implemented in response to the Anderson case. See Dominguez, 2009 
UT App 73, If 7. The pertinent portion of the rule states: 
At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the 
search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded 
testimony on which the warrant is based and shall, within a reasonable 
time, file those sealed documents in court files which are secured against 
access by the public. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 40(i)(l) (emphasis added). "[R]ule 40 is 
unambiguous in setting forth the courts' responsibility when issuing search warrants." 
Dominguez, 2009 UT App Tf 17. In effect, the rule draws a line between the judiciary and 
law enforcement. It requires that the magistrate retain and seal a copy of the warrant and 
associated documents; law enforcement, on the other hand, is not given a role in the filing 
and retention processes. Rule 40 is essential in ensuring a defendant his or her right to 
challenge the validity of a warrant. Id. 
Rule 40 was not enforced in the instant case. After the district court issued the 
warrant upon review of the affidavit and other supporting documents, the court returned 
the only copies of all the documents, including the warrant, to the detective, who received 
and retained the documents until he, not the magistrate, filed them with the clerk later 
that day. (CR: 62-63; HT: 2-4; 15-16). The magistrate, therefore, did not "retain and seal 
a copy of the search warrant" nor did the magistrate "file those sealed documents in court 
files" as required by Rule 40. Instead, the court employed the detective as its "agent" to 
comply with Rule 40. (HT: 15-16). Law enforcement cannot do the magistrate's job 
under Rule 40. Rule 40 specifically "requires the magistrate to make and keep a copy of 
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the search warrant and supporting document/' not the law enforcement officer. 
Dominguez, 2009 UT App ]f 11 (emphasis in original). 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed Rule 40 for the first time in State v. 
Dominguez. 2009 UT App 73 f 5. Dominguez addressed the respective role of the 
magistrate vis-a-vis law enforcement in obtaining and filing a search warrant. In 
Dominguez, the law enforcement officer prepared a written affidavit supporting a 
warrant, telephoned the magistrate, and read the affidavit to the magistrate over the 
phone. Id. ^3. After agreeing to issue the telephonic warrant, the magistrate instructed 
the officer to sign the magistrate's name on the warrant. Id. The magistrate did not 
record this telephonic warrant, and the defendant subsequently challenged the warrant as 
violating Rule 40. Id. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, rejecting the State's 
argument that a telephonic warrant can be recorded by a peace officer instead of the 
magistrate. Id. ^ 9-11. The court explained that Rule 40 was issued "in direct response to 
the Utah Supreme Court's desire to ensure 'that the issuing court will maintain reliable 
records of the warrants and the documents supporting them.'" Id. at 11 (citing Anderson, 
2006 UT 79, Tf 26). When law enforcement is given sole custody of the original warrant 
documents prior to filing, the reliability of the documents is compromised. 
The warrant documents in the instant case were similarly compromised. The 
Dominguez case instructs us that only the magistrate can record a telephonic warrant. 
Similarly, only a magistrate can retain, seal, and file a copy of the warrant documents in 
court files. Since law enforcement in this case had sole custody of the warrant documents 
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prior to filing and sealing with the district court, and the district court did not fulfill its 
duty under Rule 40, this Court should find that Rule 40 was violated in regards to Mr. 
Sosa's search warrant. 
B. The Exclusionary Rule Applies in this Case Because Utah Courts 
Require Strict Compliance with Rule 40(i)'s Warrant Procedure. 
When deciding whether Rule 40 violations justify application of the exclusionary 
rule, this Court must remember that the Utah Supreme Court intended for the rule to be 
"followed strictly." Dominguez, 209 UT App. 73, f 17. The rule's purpose is to separate 
the judiciary from law enforcement in order to guarantee that the courts5 records remain 
reliable. Id. f 11. Public policy requires that warrants be issued by a neutral magistrate. 
By allowing law enforcement to fulfill the magistrate's Rule 40 duty, the rule loses its 
effectiveness. Therefore, this Court should enforce Rule 40 strictly in this case and apply 
the exclusionary rule. 
The Utah Court of Appeals applied Rule 40 strictly in State v. Dominguez. 2009 
UT App. 73. The defendant in Dominguez did not challenge the warrant on probable 
cause grounds. Id. f 17. Instead, he merely challenged the warrant as a Rule 40 
violation. After reviewing extensive case law from several jurisdictions, the Utah Court 
of Appeals nonetheless decided to apply the exclusionary rule strictly in the context of 
Rule 40. See Id. at ^ 17. The Dominguez court justified its holding by explaining that 
"we take Anderson's mandate seriously" and that "the Utah Supreme Court intended to 
take a strong position on the issue." Id. This Court should reach the same conclusion in 
the instant case. 
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The public policy behind strict enforcement of Rule 40 is that it prevents potential 
mishandling or alteration of warrants, affidavits, and supporting documents. Id. f 8, 17. 
Without this rule, an individual's right to challenge the validity of a warrant would be 
compromised. Anderson, 2006 UT 79 f^ 12. Whether law enforcement has sole custody 
of warrant document for days, hours, or even minutes, the potential for mishandling and 
alteration is ever-present. 
Due to law enforcement's intimate involvement in the warrant procedure, it is not 
difficult to contemplate a scenario in which lax enforcement of Rule 40, even if relatively 
minor, could lead to inaccurate, unauthentic, or incomplete warrant documents. For 
example, a law enforcement officer concerned that a judge might deny an application for 
a search warrant could create two sets of warrant documents: one with the accurate, but 
unconvincing, facts; and another with some embellished facts. The officer could first 
show the magistrate the embellished documents and get the warrant signed. Then, upon 
receiving the documents back, the officer could easily switch out the embellished 
documents with the factually accurate (yet weaker) documents and attach the signed 
warrant page before depositing the documents with clerk's office a few minutes later. 
There would be no way of knowing that the warrant documents had been mishandled, 
and the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to challenge the warrant's validity would be 
violated. 
In other words, if Utah courts fail to strictly enforce Rule 40, the door will be 
opened for alteration and mishandling. The exact concerns that Rule 40 aims to prevent, 
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i.e. mishandling and alteration of warrant documents, can occur under the facts of the 
instant case. Thus, any violation of Rule 40, even if it means law enforcement has sole 
custody of warrant documents for only a few hours or minutes, requires application of the 
exclusionary rule. Therefore, even if this Court agrees with the trial court that the 
violations in this case are minimal, this Court should strictly enforce Rule 40 as it did in 
Dominguez. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 40 requires that the magistrate retain, seal, and file all warrant documents 
after issuing a warrant to assure accurate records and prevent mishandling or alteration of 
the documents. The warrant used to seize evidence against Mr. Sosa was defective 
because it was obtained in violation of Rule 40 when the magistrate returned all copies of 
the warrant documents to law enforcement, who had sole custody of the documents prior 
to filing. Utah courts require strict enforcement of Rule 40 for the important public 
policy reason or preventing mishandling and alteration of warrant documents. Therefore, 
the exclusionary should apply and this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. 
Sosa's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 19th day of March, 2010. 
Respectfully Submitted by: 
Clay A: Alger 
Attorney for Appellant Mauricio Sosa 
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I hereby certify that on this 19th day of March, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT MAURICIO SOSA was placed in the 
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JosephS.Hill 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
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Utah State Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A: Hearing Transcript 
- 1 -
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - WEST JORDAN 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
MAURICIO SOSA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 081402177 FS 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
August 4, 2009 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE MARK KOURIS 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: Joseph S. Hill 
SL COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY 
111 E. Broadway, 3rd Floor 
SLC, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)366-7874 
For the Defendant: Blake A Nakamura 
142 E. 200 S. #312 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)530-1541 
Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT 
273 Interlochen Ln. 
Stansbury Park, UT 84074 
Telephone: (435) 590-5575 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
( E l e c t r o n i c a l l y r e c o r d e d on August 4, 2009) 
THE COURT: L e t ' s c a l l t h e Sosa c a s e , t h e n . We have 
i s Mr. H i l l h e r e ? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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MR. HILL: Yes. 
THE COURT: He is. All right. Let's call the case 
of the State of Utah vs. Mr. Mauricio -- am I pronouncing that 
right, sir? 
MR. SOSA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mauricio Sosa. Good afternoon, Mr. Sosa. 
The case is 08142177. I've had an opportunity to read all the 
briefs that have been submitted, as well as the cases. 
The first thing I need to ask you, Mr. Nakamura, just 
so I understand exactly what facts we're dealing with because I 
think Mr. Hill -- actually both of you, because I think the facts 
are stipulated here. If I understand the facts you're saying, an 
officer comes — I don't know if this is -- did I sign this 
warrant, by the way? 
MR. NAKAMURA: You did, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. So this is good reflection on me. 
Thank you. 
MR. NAKAMURA: I was trying to keep that --
THE COURT: I appreciate that. So the officer came into 
my chambers. I signed the warrant. He then took the warrant 
from my office, went downstairs and filed it with the clerk? 
~3
~ 
1 MR. NAKAMURA: Well, I think it's a little bit more 
2 involved than that. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. NAKAMURA: He came into your chambers. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. NAKAMURA: Presented you with the proposed warrant, 
7 along with the affidavit and any supporting documents. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. NAKAMURA: The Court did what it deemed was 
10 appropriate at that point, which I believe was to sign the 
11 warrant. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. NAKAMURA: Then returned the warrant, the affidavit 
14 and all supporting documents -- basically, all the documents that 
15 the officer came into the chambers with --
16 THE COURT: To the officer. 
17 MR. NAKAMURA: -- back to the officer. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. NAKAMURA: The officer then exited chambers, went 
20 downstairs and then went to the warrants clerk, I assume --
21 THE COURT: And signed off on that. 
22 MR. NAKAMURA: -- who then takes that whole bulk of 
23 documents --
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. NAKAMURA: -- records it in, gives back to the 
~4 
1 officer those copies or originals that the officer is supposed 
2 to have, retains those copies or originals that the Court is 
3 supposed to have. 
4 THE COURT: Got you. So we're clear, then, there's no 
5 allegation the officer left the building? 
6 MR. NAKAMURA: No. 
7 THE COURT: There's -- and the amount of time roughly 
8 from the third floor of my office down to the first floor was 
9 probably within the range of maybe 10 to 15 minutes? 
10 MR. NAKAMURA: Yeah, and that -- exactly, Judge. 
11 THE COURT: If that? 
12 MR. NAKAMURA: That's correct. I mean whatever time it 
13 would have taken the officer to go from your office down to the 
14 warrants clerk's office is the only time. 
15 THE COURT: Sure. Okay. 
16 MR. NAKAMURA: I think the issue that we're raising in 
17 that regard, though, Judge, is the same concern that was raised 
18 in Anderson -- the second concern raised in Anderson, that the 
19 Dommguez case was ultimately based upon. When you look at the 
20 Dommguez case, it obviously goes to Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of 
21 Criminal Procedure. 
22 THE COURT: Right. 
23 MR. NAKAMURA: The general issue is what does that rule 
24 really mean. 
25 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
-5-
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MR. NAKAMURA: We now know from the Dominguez case that 
what the rule means is that it places certain responsibilities 
upon the magistrate. In fact, on paragraph 11 in the opinion, 
they state, "We conclude that Rule 40 (i) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure requires the magistrate" -- italicized --
"to make and keep a copy of the search warrant and supporting 
documents. It is not sufficient for the peace officer alone to 
retain this information and subsequently supply it to the Court," 
which is exactly what happened here. 
THE COURT: Okay. So we're clear -- crystal clear, in 
the Dominguez case it was a telephonic warrant, correct? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Right. 
THE COURT: It was unrecorded, correct? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Right. 
THE COURT: So the next morning in this case, not only 
did the magistrate not have a copy of -- well, the magistrate had 
absolutely no copy of what happened the night before; is that 
correct? 
MR. NAKAMURA: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And how many hours elapsed between the time 
the magistrate issued the warrant and the warrant was presented 
to the Court? 
MR. NAKAMURA: A number of hours, but I would suggest 
that when you look at the Dominguez case, the facts of this 
Dominguez case, and indeed the facts of the Anderson case are not 
-6-
1 the material information necessarily relied upon by the Court to 
2 come to its ruling, but rather an interpretation of the rule. I 
3 guess that's what I would respond to. 
4 In the State's memorandum, they're saying, "Wait, 
5 the facts are distinguishable." Well, they are indeed 
6 distinguishable, but they are still facts that do not comply with 
7 the rule. When you look at Anderson and now the Dominguez case, 
8 those facts are different. Anderson is different from Dominguez, 
9 Dominguez is different from Anderson. 
10 Indeed the federal cases that they looked to in deciding 
11 the Dominguez case are slightly different as well factually, but 
12 the rule is the same. Thus, we then come down to the issue of, 
13 "Well, how strictly shall we interpret Rule 40?" 
14 The Dominguez case answers that, too. They indicate, 
15 "Well, this is a question of first impression for us." They say 
16 in paragraph 17, "Because this is an issue of first impression, 
17 we are left to decide for the first time how strictly Rule 40 
18 should be enforced in Utah." They go on to state that it shall 
19 be strictly enforced. 
20 Essentially in -- and they state that the Anderson --
21 the Supreme Court in Anderson, their ruling there. They say, 
22 "We assume that the Utah Supreme Court wishes this rule to be 
23 followed strictly now that it has been implemented." Then as 
24 they go on they conclude with, "Thus, Rule 40 is unambiguous in 
25 setting forth the Court's responsibility when issuing search 
-7-
1 warrants, including those sought telephonically" -- voila, the 
2 facts aren't distinguishable ones. "Accordingly, we reverse." 
3 But they go on to say that it is to be strictly followed. 
4 However, there's on other issue that I think you have to 
5 look at. You have to go back to Anderson, because the Dominguez 
6 case really relied upon the Supreme Court's Anderson case to come 
7 to the ruling that they did in saying that Rule 40 must be 
8 strictly followed and strictly interpreted. 
9 When we look at the Anderson case, which they quote in 
10 their decision, they cite two concerns that exist when the rule 
11 is not strictly followed. The second concern is exactly the 
12 concern that could be at play here. 
13 On paragraph -- it's in paragraph --
14 THE COURT: Paragraph 22? 
15 MR. NAKAMURA: Well, it's in paragraph 8 of the opinion, 
16 but paragraph -- apparently 2 of the Anderson opinion. Halfway 
17 down it says, "Second, it allows for the possibility that 
18 affidavits and other court records may be mishandled or even 
19 altered without detection. When the records upon which the 
20 magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are handled by persons other 
21 than court personnel prior to it being filed with the Court, the 
22 Court has no basis for confidence in the accuracy, authenticity 
23 or completeness of those documents." 
24 What I'm suggesting, your Honor, is while I am not 
25 insinuating that the officer did anything inappropriate in this 
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case, and while I will acknowledge that the period of time that 
the officer had all the documents alone would have been fairly 
short, it still would have allowed for the possibility for some 
alteration to occur in the affidavit or supporting documents. 
If you will, the officer could come into the Court with 
one affidavit designed to pass muster, if you will, present it to 
the Court. The Court reviews it, relies upon it, signs off on 
the warrant, gives it all back to the officer. As the officer 
is leaving the court, another affidavit and another supporting 
document is in there, perhaps one more accurately reflecting the 
facts of the case. That's the one that ultimately gets filed. 
The concern raised here is well, then how in the 
world if the Court doesn't retain it at that point when they're 
reviewed and signed, how do we know -- how would the Court know 
what documents were reviewed and relied upon9 That's exactly 
what happened here. 
If it were challenged, the Court would be left with, 
"Well, what did you present? I thought the affidavit I read 
said this, this, this and this, but this doesn't say this, this, 
this and this. But I have no way to know." Why? Because the 
documents ultimately all got put into the possession of the 
officer, and there would be no way for a Court to then determine 
whether those were the original documents that they reviewed and 
relied upon in issuing the warrant. 
So while I acknowledge that the facts in this case are 
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1 distinct from Anderson, they're clearly distinct from Dominguez. 
2 The Dominguez case is not -- the ruling in the Dominguez case is 
3 not really factually based. It's really an interpretation of a 
4 statute or a rule. That's what it's based upon. The rule is 
5 clear, and it puts clear responsibilities on Courts, and it 
6 requires strict adherence to the rule. Under the rule, this 
7 wasn't followed. 
8 The very reason why the Court so ruled that it should 
9 be strictly followed is a concern that very much exists in this 
10 matter, i.e., the Court who reviews and signs no longer has 
11 custody of those original documents. Once that occurs -- I 
12 don't care if it's for a nanosecond -- there's no way for a Court 
13 to then upon challenge to say, "What did I actually review?" 
14 There's just no way to do it. 
15 When you look at the totality of the Dominguez opinion, 
16 and even going to the Anderson opinion, and even the federal 
17 court decisions that Court of Appeals looked to for guidance in 
18 coming to this ruling, that is of a paramount concern. 
19 As it states in the federal cases, they have a situation 
20 where if an officer or an agent calls a federal judge for a 
21 search warrant telephonically it's recorded, the entirety of it. 
22 It's recorded, retained by the Court. So if there's any question 
23 about the information that the Court relied upon in issuing the 
24 warrant, they've got that recorded. 
25 When you look at all the other decisions that they 
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reviewed in coming to their opinion, that's exactly what they 
were looking for. In this case, we don't have it. We don't have 
it because even for a brief moment that officer did not retain 
all the documents. That's an opportunity that point 2 in the 
Anderson decision directly relates to. 
So we contend that the ruling of Dominguez is Rule 40 
should be strictly followed, and it wasn't strictly followed 
here . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. NAKAMURA: So we're asking for the same relief that 
was offered in Dominguez as well. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hill? 
MR. HILL: Your Honor, the Dominguez case -- obviously 
the facts -- and I don't think it's in dispute that the facts are 
vastly different than what we're dealing with here. I mean it's 
a telephonic warrant where the officer -- I mean I'm not going 
to -- I'm sure the Court knows the facts, but they're dealing 
with a telephonic warrant where the Judge never actually had any 
copy of the affidavits, never made any recording on it, and then 
subsequently receives this on the return of service. 
I think that was the main issue that Dominguez was 
dealing with. They say in -- paragraph 11 of the Dominguez 
says, "We conclude that Rule 40 (i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires the magistrate to make and keep a copy of the 
search warrant and supporting documents." Then the next 
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sentence, "It is not sufficient for the peace officer alone to 
retain this information and subsequently supply it to the Court." 
They're specifically speaking to those -- that set of 
facts. In this case I don't think we have that issue. It's --
the officer isn't taking it and then (inaudible) supplying it to 
the Court. He's taking it, and out of convenience for the Court, 
I believe, walking it down to the clerk, where we verified in 
this case that it was logged in, that it was -- a copy was made 
and kept on file with the Court. 
I think the concerns that Anderson and Dominguez had 
were that if this officer is allowed to retain these affidavits 
and then subsequently bring it back and (inaudible) to the Court, 
then this defendant has no way to go back and attack the validity 
of the probable cause included in that affidavit that was 
presented to the magistrate. 
In this case I just don't think that there are those 
same concerns. The officer gives your Honor the affidavit. 
It was signed. It was filed. There's a copy of it there. 
If there's any need, or the defendant wants to come back and 
attack the validity of that probable cause, he's able to do that. 
There's a copy that was kept on file with the Court. 
If there's another copy out there, obvi -- that the 
officer changed or altered in any way, it's easily detected with 
what's been on file with the Court. I think we're grasping at 
straws to say that an officer is going to walk out of your 
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1 courtroom and on his way to -- and I know that allegation hasn't 
2 been made, but in that brief time walking down to the clerk's 
3 office he's going to add a bunch of information or attack 
4 something else there. I just don't think it's a valid concern 
5 in this case. 
6 The language that they use as quoting Anderson, in 
7 the Dominguez there are concerns about the accuracy, authenticity 
8 and completeness of the affidavits. Again, I think in this case 
9 there's -- there are ways to make sure that that's not the case. 
10 We can compare what was filed and what comes back from 
11 the officer in the return of service. I just don't think that 
12 intervening -- you know, I would (inaudible) that it would be 
13 less than 10 minutes -- I would say five or less for him to walk 
14 down and file it with the Court, that it's the exact same thing 
15 that came from your Honor's hand. 
16 I just don't think that the facts are similar enough in 
17 this case, or the concern is similar enough in this case as they 
18 were in the Anderson or the Dominguez case to apply that -- well, 
19 to find the same result that the Dominguez Court found. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
21 MR. NAKAMURA: One last comment, Judge. Here's the 
22 problem. When you look at the second point that the Anderson 
23 Court makes, they are very specific the documents that they're 
24 concerned about, and they talk about the affidavit and the 
25 supporting documents. They don't talk about the warrant. 
-13-
1 Then you say, "Well, wait a second, why are they being 
2 so specific on the affidavit and the supporting documents?" 
3 Because those are documents, a duplication of which nobody would 
4 know, the Court included. They are documents of which that could 
5 be drafted, executed without having anybody else know that there 
6 are two. 
7 The State makes an issue about, "Well, there just isn't 
8 enough time for any kind of opportunity for impropriety to exist. 
9 It's minutes, if that." But there doesn't need to be any time, 
10 because the documents that the Anderson Court was concerned about 
11 are documents for which duplicates could be made and nobody would 
12 be aware of those duplicates, and inserted into the original 
13 documents within seconds, not minutes, if that's what was 
14 desired. 
15 I would concede that if we are just dealing with the 
16 case language of Rule 40, the case language of this places clear 
17 responsibilities on the magistrate who shall retain, the case 
18 language of this rule is to be strictly interpreted, perhaps the 
19 State might have some room to say, "Well, but the deviation here 
20 is de minimis. It's de minimis and therefore not material." 
21 But when you then look at the Anderson opinion and 
22 the concerns they raise, and how the Dominguez Court relied upon 
23 the Anderson opinion to come up with their rulings of strict 
24 compliance, and because the reasoning or one of the concerns in 
25 Anderson is exactly the concern here, now you say, "Well, wait a 
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1 second. You can't really get around that." 
2 The language of Dominguez is real clear; strictly 
3 follow it, strictly interpret it. Rule 40 is real clear; the 
4 magistrate shall do this. If you even look at the first point 
5 in the Anderson case, they're clear about what that concern is. 
6 They make very specific, if you will, notes about that first 
7 concern, and that note is, "If it leaves the Court without any 
8 record of the warrant or the materials supporting its issuance 
9 until after the warrant is executed and a return is filed." 
10 Well, what it's saying there is, "Gee, you know, all 
11 that kind of time while the thing is being held, while it's being 
12 held in preparation for execution, there it is that concern." 
13 They were very specific about the parameters of that 
14 concern. If they thought that well, you know, really the 
15 parameters should be broader on point 2, they would have said so, 
16 but they weren't. 
17 What they say in point 2 is very clear. "When the 
18 records upon which the magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are 
19 handled by persons other than the court personnel prior to being 
20 filed with the Court" -- not prior to being executed, not after 
21 being executed, just filed with the Court -- "the Court has no 
22 basis for confidence in the accuracy, authenticity or 
23 completeness of those records." 
24 What I'm obviously suggesting is they were contemplating 
25 even this situation. Why? Because the language is very clear. 
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1 They were very deliberate in the words that they chose. 
2 When you think about how this worked in this case, we 
3 can see the application, primarily because the affidavit and the 
4 supporting documents can have duplicates without anybody knowing 
5 and being inserted thereafter, and then that document -- not 
6 the one that the Court looked at, but the one that was inserted 
7 between the Court's signature and the filing gets filed with the 
8 warrants clerk. 
9 When that gets detected by defense Counsel and 
10 challenged, the Court now is without any record to ensure that 
11 those documents filed were the same documents that it reviewed. 
12 I don't think there's any question about that. 
13 It does sound like it's a de minimis argument until you 
14 carefully read the Dominguez opinion and you carefully read the 
15 Anderson opinion and the concerns, and thus that's why we believe 
16 it has application even to these set of facts, Judge. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Well, given the fact that the 
18 stipulation is that these documents, No. 1, never left the 
19 courthouse, and No. 2, the time frame to get from my chambers 
20 down to file it is probably five minutes or less, I would 
21 say -- that's based on my experience of actually making that walk 
22 before -- I would say that this is unquestionably a de minimis 
23 argument, and I reject the premise that Mr. Nakamura is making 
24 here. 
25 First of all, when the officer takes those documents 
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1 from me, they are acting as my agent to carry it down and 
2 actually have it filed instead of me actually walking down and 
3 having it filed. When we're splitting hairs this small, when 
4 the -- as the Anderson says, the possibility that they may be 
5 mishandled, that gives you a little bit more time frame. They 
6 don't think that person is going to mishandle something in five 
7 minutes. Or that it might be altered without detection. Again, 
8 I would guess that they're looking at something with a much 
9 larger time frame. 
10 If in fact we were to ascribe the nefarious -- I guess 
11 motivation of the officer that Mr. Nakamura is saying, saying, 
12 "What I'm going to do is take some fakes in there, have the 
13 gov -- have the Judge look at the good ones, and then substitute 
14 it out as I'm walking for that five minute walk down," well, then 
15 I think we'd have to take it the next step, then, and say, "Well, 
16 then the Judge shouldn't be allowed to leave those things in his 
17 inbox in his office for his clerk to be taking them down, because 
18 there's always a chance an officer will be back in the halls, and 
19 he might sneak in there and switch them out anyway." 
20 Well, if we're going to ascribe that sort of motivations 
21 to the officer, I think we've got a lot bigger problems than what 
22 we're dealing with here, and I don't believe that to be the case. 
23 So based upon that, then, I find that in fact this was 
24 in strict reading of Rule 40. The way this was handled was the 
25 way it should have been handled, and I don't see any problem with 
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it. So I'm going to deny Mr. Nakamura's motion. 
Now that having been said, Mr. Nakamura, where do we 
want to go from here? Do we need another date? 
MR. NAKAMURA: I think we just need a final pre-trial, 
your Honor, to see where this is going. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do we have a trial date? 
MR. NAKAMURA: I don't think we have a trial date set. 
MR. HILL: It's (inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. Two weeks out, is that what 
we're thinking? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Yeah, that's fine. 
THE COURT: Okay. How does the 17th at 8:30 look? Does 
that work for you? Is the 18th better? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Well, that week I'm scheduled to be out 
of town, but it's not coming together yet. 
THE COURT: Are you? Okay. How does August 31st at 
7:30 -- or 8:30 look? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Well, August 31st at 1:30 looks grand. 
THE COURT: That will be your time, then. August 31st 
at 1:30 for another roll call. Then at that point we'll get it 
either on a trial track or figure out where we're headed from 
there. 
MR. NAKAMURA: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Xaix? 
-18-
1 MR. XAIX: Good afternoon, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 
3 MR. HILL: I'm sorry, Judge, would you like findings of 
4 fact and conclusions of law? 
5 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
6 MR. HILL: Would you like me to prepare findings of 
7 fact? 
8 THE COURT: Would you mind? 
9 MR. HILL: Sure. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. 
11 (Hearing concluded) 
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Search Warrant Page 1 ' ' 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
NO. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Detective Ethan 
Alexander of the Sandy City Police Department, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to 
believe: 
The undersigned affiant, Detective Ethan Alexander of the Sandy Police Department, being first 
duly sworn, deposes and says that he has reason to believe: 
That (X) on the premises known 872 E Willow Wood Dr, Sandy Utah: further described as being 
a two-story, single family dwelling home, that sits on the south side of Willow Wood Dr. The 
residence is situated on the lot with the front of the residence facing northeast on Willow Wood 
Dr. There is a glass storm dorm with white trim over the front door of the home. The front door 
also faces northeast. A three-car garage is attached to the east side of the home. The garage has 
two white doors. The eastern most door, is a single car door and the western most door, is a two-
car door. The numbers 872 are affixed to the front of the home, directly above the garage door. 
The numbers are horizontally stenciled in dark numbering and sit above the two-car door of the 
three-car garage. The numbers 872 are also painted on the curb directly in front of the home. The 
numbers are stenciled in white paint over a black paint background. The residence is further 
described as having a light purple stucco finish with white trim. There are a total of three 
windows on the front side of the residence. One window sits behind the porch on the east side of 
the front door. The other two windows are positioned on the west side of the home. A wooden 
fence encloses the backyard of the residence. To include all outbuildings, (affixed or unattached) 
and containers on the curtilage of the property commonly associated with 872 E Willow Wood 
Dr. 
and in the CITY OF DRAPER, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, there is 
now certain property of evidence described as: 
Search Warrant Page 2 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE SUBSTANCE IN POWDER OR ROCK 
FORM. 
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT BEING LIMITED TO 
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES, SCALES, AND 
MATERIAL USED TO DILUTE, OR "CUT" COCAINE. 
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT BEING LIMITED TO 
SYRINGES, BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT 
STRAWS, PIPES FOR SMOKING OR TUBES FOR INHALING COCAINE, AND 
GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE OR USE COCAINE. 
4. MDMA, A SUBSTANCE IN TABLET, CAPSULE, POWDER OR 
CRYSTAL FORM THAT MAY VARY IN COLOR. 
5. PACKAGING MATERIAL; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO PLASTIC 
BAGS, TAPE, PLASTIC BUBBLE WRAP, CANISTERS OR TINS. 
6. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT BEING LIMITED 
TO GLOW STICKS, N20 BOTTLES (WIPPETS), BALLOONS, VAPOR RUB, 
DUST MASKS, FLASHING LIGHTS, MOUTH PIECES, BABY PACIFIERS. 
7. MARIJUANA; IN ALL FORMS INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO 
HASHISH, HASHISH OIL, AND THE PLANTED PLANT AND IT'S DRIED LEAVES 
AND PARTS. 
8. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PIPES AND 
ROLLING PAPERS FOR SMOKING MARIJUANA, SCALES, AND ITEMS USED FOR 
THE GROWING AND CULTIVATION OF MARIJUANA (GROWING LIGHTS, 
POWER SOURCES, AND TRANSFORMERS, WATERING DEVICES, ETC.). 
9. RESIDENCY PAPERS; TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT LIMITED TO UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/ LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
10. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE 
NARCOTICS BEING SEARCHED FOR, AND ANY AND ALL ITEMS THAT ARE 
Search Warrant Page 3 
DETERMINED TO BE COLLATERAL OR PROCEEDS FROM NARCOTICS 
TRANSACTIONS. 
11. ARTICLES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TENDING TO ESTABLISH AND 
DOCUMENT SALES OF MARIJUANA AND/ OR OTHER CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES, OR CONSPIRACY TO MANUFACTURE/CULTIVATE, DISTRIBUTE, 
AND/OR POSSESS WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE MARIJUANA AND/OR 
OTHER CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. CONSISTING IN PART OF AND 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO : US CURRENCY, BUYER LISTS, SELLER 
LISTS, LEDGERS, TALLY SHEETS, RECORDATIONS OF SALES AND 
RECORDATIONS OF PURCHASES OF ASSETS NOTED. 
12. ANY OTHER FRUITS AND/OR ITEMS DETERMINED TO BE 
INSTRUMENTALITIES OF EVIDENCE OF THE CRIMES OF CULTIVATING OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND 
OR POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH THE INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE. 
13. FIREARMS USED TO PROTECT AND OR DERIVED AS PROCEEDS 
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO; RIFLES, HANDGUNS, AND SHOTGUNS. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means committing or 
concealing a public offense, or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a 
party to the illegal conduct 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED: 
(X ) At any time day or night; (good cause having been shown) 
(X ) To execute without notice of authority or purpose (proof under oath being shown that the 
object(s) of this search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may result to any 
person if notice were given). 
tlT<-.pCLI.',u I OLEV/LY 
Search Warrant Page 4 
To make search of the above named or described person(s), and premises for 
the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part 
thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Third District Court, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND 
and dated this U day of A u W p 2008. 
JUDGE OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
M r >, 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 8080 S. Redwood Rd. 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned affiant, Detective Ethan Alexander of the Sandy Police Department, being first 
duly sworn, deposes and says that he has reason to believe: 
That (X) on the premises known 872 E Willow Wood Dr, Sandy Utah: further described as being 
a two-story, single family dwelling home, that sits on the south side of Willow Wood Dr. The 
residence is situated on the lot with the front of the residence facing northeast on Willow Wood 
Dr. There is a glass storm dorm with white trim over the front door of the home. The front door 
also faces northeast. A three-car garage is attached to the east side of the home. The garage has 
two white doors. The eastern most door, is a single car door and the western most door, is a two-
car door. The numbers 872 are affixed to the front of the home, directly above the garage door. 
The numbers are horizontally stenciled in dark numbering and sit above the two-car door of the 
three-car garage. The numbers 872 are also painted on the curb directly in front of the home. The 
numbers are stenciled in white paint over a black paint background. The residence is further 
described as having a light purple stucco finish with white trim. There are a total of three 
windows on the front side of the residence. One window sits behind the porch on the east side of 
the front door. The other two windows are positioned on the west side of the home. A wooden 
fence encloses the backyard of the residence. To include all outbuildings, (affixed or unattached) 
and containers on the curtilage of the property commonly associated with 872 E Willow Wood 
Dr. 
and in the CITY OF DRAPER, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, there is 
now certain property of evidence described as: 
A T * '. - - ~, , 
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Affidavit for search warrant page 2 ' 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE SUBSTANCE IN POWDER OR ROCK 
FORM. 
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT BEING LIMITED TO 
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES, SCALES, AND 
MATERIAL USED TO DILUTE, OR "CUT" COCAINE. 
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT BEING LIMITED TO 
SYRINGES, BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT 
STRAWS, PIPES FOR SMOKING OR TUBES FOR INHALING COCAINE, AND 
GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE OR USE COCAINE. 
4. MDMA, A SUBSTANCE IN TABLET, CAPSULE, POWDER OR 
CRYSTAL FORM THAT MAY VARY IN COLOR. 
5. PACKAGING MATERIAL; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO PLASTIC 
BAGS, TAPE, PLASTIC BUBBLE WRAP, CANISTERS OR TINS. 
6. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT BEING LIMITED 
TO GLOW STICKS, N20 BOTTLES (WIPPETS), BALLOONS, VAPOR RUB, 
DUST MASKS, FLASHING LIGHTS, MOUTH PIECES, BABY PACIFIERS. 
7. MARIJUANA; IN ALL FORMS INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO 
HASHISH, HASHISH OIL, AND THE PLANTED PLANT AND IT'S DRIED LEAVES 
AND PARTS. 
8. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PIPES AND 
ROLLING PAPERS FOR SMOKING MARIJUANA, SCALES, AND ITEMS USED FOR 
THE GROWING AND CULTIVATION OF MARIJUANA (GROWING LIGHTS, 
POWER SOURCES, AND TRANSFORMERS, WATERING DEVICES, ETC.). 
9. RESIDENCY PAPERS; TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT LIMITED TO UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/ LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
10. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE 
NARCOTICS BEING SEARCHED FOR, AND ANY AND ALL ITEMS THAT ARE 
DETERMINED TO BE COLLATERAL OR PROCEEDS FROM NARCOTICS 
TRANSACTIONS. 
11. ARTICLES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TENDING TO ESTABLISH AND 
DOCUMENT SALES OF MARIJUANA AND/ OR OTHER CONTROLLED 
Affidavit for search warrant page 3 
SUBSTANCES, OR CONSPIRACY TO MANUFACTURE/CULTIVATE, DISTRIBUTE, 
AND/OR POSSESS WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE MARIJUANA AND/OR 
OTHER CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. CONSISTING IN PART OF AND 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO : US CURRENCY, BUYER LISTS, SELLER 
LISTS, LEDGERS, TALLY SHEETS, RECORDATIONS OF SALES AND 
RECORDATIONS OF PURCHASES OF ASSETS NOTED. 
12. ANY OTHER FRUITS AND/OR ITEMS DETERMINED TO BE 
INSTRUMENTALITIES OF EVIDENCE OF THE CRIMES OF CULTIVATING OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND 
OR POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH THE INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE. 
13. FIREARMS USED TO PROTECT AND OR DERIVED AS PROCEEDS 
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO; RIFLES, HANDGUNS, AND SHOTGUNS. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means committing or 
concealing a public offense, or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a 
party to the illegal conduct 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or 
crimes of: 
Possession of a controlled substance. 
Possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. 
Your affiant is a Certified Peace Officer in the State of Utah, and has more than two years of law 
enforcement experience. Your affiant is a Sandy City Police Officer, currently assigned to Sandy 
City Police Department Narcotics Unit and the Sandy Mobile Crime Scene Unit. Your affiant 
has assisted in investigating local illegal drug trafficking organizations and prescription frauds. 
Your affiant has trained in and utilized several investigative techniques such as; surveillance of 
suspected drug sales operations, controlled trash covers, interrogation of suspects and 
informants, and investigating intelligence reports received from citizens. Your affiant has 
investigated cases where hand-to-hand purchases of narcotics were observed. Your affiant has 
also acted in undercover capacities, where he has personally purchased and performed hand-to-
hand purchases of illegal narcotics. Your affiant has investigated cases where search warrants 
were obtained and served. 
V~'£ 
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Your affiant's specialized training includes drug identification and recognition courses hosted by 
Utah Peace Officers Standards and Training during basic training, narcotics enforcement courses 
hosted by the Sandy City Police Department, Crime Scene Investigation, Photogrammetry hosted 
by UHP, Videography hosted by Midwest Counterdrug Training Center (MCTC) 
The facts to establish grounds for a Search Warrant are: 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT 
Your affiant received information from a confidential informant (CI), that an individual named 
James Ray Sosa-DOB: 09/20/1987, is distributing cocaine in the Salt Lake Valley. The CI 
pointed out a home at 872 E Willow Wood Dr in Draper City and told your affiant it is where 
James lives. Your affiant ran James' information and found a DL on file with the same address. 
The CI told your affiant they have purchased cocaine from James on several occasions, from the 
listed residence and said James keeps the cocaine in a shoebox in his bedroom. James does not 
have a criminal history. 
CONTROLLED TRASH COVER #1 
07/16/2008: 
With the assistance of Detective Elliott #310 and Detective Goodwin #180, also Sandy Narcotics 
detectives, your affiant performed a controlled trash cover at the listed residence. Your affiant 
contacted a local trash driver to assist with the cover. Your affiant met with the driver and 
inspected the loading compartment of the truck. Your affiant observed the back of the truck was 
free and clear of any garbage, as the truck had not yet begun its routes. Your affiant got into the 
passenger seat of the truck and pointed out the house and the garbage to the driver. Your affiant 
observed the truck pick up only the garbage in front of 872 E Willow Wood Dr. 
Your affiant then had the driver go to a predetermined location, so the garbage could be 
unloaded. No other garbage, from any other homes, was picked up. At the location, your affiant 
threw the bags of garbage to Elliott and Goodwin. Your affiant then sorted through the remaining 
trash in the back of the truck. 
Inside the garbage, your affiant found residency papers for James Sosa and Mauricio Sosa DOB: 
04/15/1967. Also found in the garbage was a plastic "teener" bag with a white powdery residue. 
From your affiant's training and experience, he recognized the bag as a common way to package 
illicit drugs and the powder was consistent with cocaine. At the office, your affiant swabbed a 
section of the plastic bag and performed a NIK test. The test flashed positive for cocaine. 
Your affiant ran Mauricio Sosa's information and found a drivers license on file with the listed 
address. Mauricio also has a revoked concealed firearms permit, along with a criminal history 
that includes felony burglary. The seized items were booked into Sandy PD evidence. 
07/23/2008: 
Your affiant attempted to perform a trash cover on the listed residence, however the trash was 
never taken to the street. 
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07/30/2008: 
Your affiant again attempted a trash cover on the listed residence and again the garbage was not 
taken to the street. 
CONTROLLED TRASH COVER #2 
08/06/2008: 
With the assistance of Sgt Arnold, the Sandy Narcotics Sergeant, your affiant performed a 
controlled trash cover at the listed residence. Your affiant contacted a local trash driver to assist 
with the cover. Your affiant met with the driver and inspected the loading compartment of the 
truck. Your affiant observed the back of the truck was free and clear of any garbage. Your affiant 
got into the passenger seat of the truck and pointed out the house and the garbage to the driver. 
Your affiant observed the truck pick up only the garbage in front of 872 E Willow Wood Dr. 
Your affiant then had the driver go to a predetermined location, so the garbage could be 
unloaded. No other garbage, from any other homes, was picked up. At the location, your affiant 
threw the bags of garbage to Sgt Arnold. Your affiant then sorted through the remaining trash in 
the back of the truck. 
Inside the garbage, a stem was found, that from your affiant's training and experience, was 
consistent with a marijuana stem. Also seized was a small plastic "twist", which is the cut off 
corner of a plastic bag. Your affiant recognized the twist as a common packaging style for the 
distribution of cocaine. The twist had a white powder residue, which, from your affiant's training 
and experience, was consistent with cocaine. Also seized were seven plastic zip-loc style bags. 
There was a large amount of green dust inside the bags, which appeared to be residue of MDMA, 
commonly referred to as ecstasy. Also seized from the trash was residency paperwork for Jeffrey 
Sosa and Morris Sosa. 
At the office, your affiant swabbed a section of the plastic twist and performed a NIK test. The 
test flashed positive for cocaine. Your affiant then swabbed the green residue from one of the 
zip-loc bags and performed a NIK test. The test flashed positive for MDMA. Your affiant 
swabbed another bag that contained the green powder and performed a NIK test. It again flashed 
positive for MDMA. 
Your affiant ran the names Morris Sosa and Jeffrey Sosa in the state system. Your affiant 
discovered a Jeffrey Morris Sosa DOB: 07/03/1989 that has a driver's license with the listed 
residence. Jeffrey has no criminal history. The seized items were booked into Sandy PD 
evidence. 
Your affiant considers the information from the confidential source reliable because: 
Your affiant or the Sandy Police Department has promised the confidential informant nothing. 
The confidential informant has given your affiant their name, address, and phone number to be 
contacted. The confidential informant voluntarily provided information to help decrease the 
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amount of drugs being distributed, therefore making the neighborhood a safer place for families 
and children. 
Your affiant asks the court not to require your affiant to reveal the names of the confidential 
sources for fear of physical retaliation by the suspect(s) in this case, or by any of their 
criminal associates. Threats of physical harm against individuals thought to be giving 
information to police are commonplace. Your affiant fears that if the confidential sources 
identities were made known, further information coming from confidential sources would be 
jeopardized. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items: 
(X) At any time day or night; because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the 
property prior to it being concealed, damaged, destroyed , or altered, or for other good reasons 
to-wit: 
Your affiant plans to use a highly trained entry team, which employs specialized tactics. The 
cover of darkness upon approach to residence would be safer for both these officers and the 
neighboring civilians, as it should give the officers the element of surprise and reduce the time 
the suspect(s) would have to conceal evidence or procure a weapon. Upon further information 
obtained through the CI and through controlled trash covers, your affiant believes the occupants 
of the listed residence are distributing cocaine and MDMA. Based on his training and experience 
your affiant knows suspects involved in cocaine and MDMA distribution often protect their 
operation from robbery and police though the use of booby traps and weapons. One of the 
residents of 872 E Willow Wood Dr, Mauricio Sosa, has a concealed firearms permit that has 
been revoked. This leads your affiant to believe that he may be in possession of a firearm. 
Additionally, your affiant has observed several civilians near and around the residence. The 
residence also shares a border with the Mehraban Wetlands Park. A walkway,"that is an entrance 
to the park, runs along the west side of the target location's property. This park is a common 
location for people to walk for leisure or exercise. This park also has a duck pond, where it is 
common for parents to take their children to feed the ducks and geese. Your affiant has observed 
several civilians and children in this park in the past in the morning, day and evening. Making 
entry into the residence after dark would increase the likelihood that innocent civilians and 
children would be in bed asleep and out of harms way. 
(X ) To execute without notice of authority or purpose (proof under oath being shown that the 
object(s) of this search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may result to any 
person if notice were given ). This danger is believed to exist because: 
Affidavit for search warrant page 7 w'' ""'.'.[ : 
Through training and experience your affiant knows that objects of evidence that are small in 
nature are easily secreted or destroyed very quickly. Through the controlled trash covers 
conducted by your affiant there were objects of evidence very small in nature that is typically 
associated with the use, packaging, and distribution of cocaine and MDMA. Through training 
and experience your affiant knows that suspects involved in the illegal trafficking of drugs 
often procure weapons, including but not limited to firearms for protection. Through research 
into the residence and controlled trash covers, your affiant has discovered that one of the 
occupants, Mauricio Sosa, has a revoked concealed firearms permit. This leads your affiant to 
believe he may be in possession of a firearm. Your affiant feels if entry into the target home 
was delayed it would place the officers involved in the execution of the search warrant and the 
neighboring civilians in unnecessary risk, by giving the occupants of the target home the time 
to conceal evidence or procure a weapon. 
'Your Affiant has had this Warrant/Affidavit reviewed by Deputy Salt Lake District 
Attorney Josh Player and the Warrant /Affidavit has been approved for the presentation to 
the Court. 
I D F M T I V E E. Alexander 
' Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
this \\ day of k\Jb^n , 2008. 
L. 
Judge of Th,e Third District Court, 
. And For the Comity of Salt Lake, 
TUtahVo"';-'"'*;*'* J? 
